s.22 Theft Act 1968
A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of stealing), knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person, or if he arranges to do so.
The accused's knowledge or belief as to the nature of the goods is crucial, but has been a constant source of interpretive problems. Either may be based on what the thief says or some other positive information, but belief is less than knowledge and more than mere suspicion. In R v Hall ([1985] 81 Cr App R 260), it was held that, per
Boreham, J.,
Belief.. is something short of knowledge. It may be said to be the state of mind of a person who says to himself: "I cannot say I know for certain that these goods are stolen, but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the circumstances, in the light of all that I have heard and seen".
He went on to distinguish the case where a defendant has said
"I suspect that these goods may be stolen, but it may be on the other hand that they are not"
The situation is further complicated by the concept of recklessness or wilful blindness to the circumstances; either will be treated as a belief that the goods are stolen. Thus,
suspicion will be converted into belief when the facts are so obvious that belief may safely be
imputed. So if the defendant bought goods in a pub or a dark alley for a fraction of their true value and it is clear that identification marks or serial numbers have been erased, any denial of belief by the defendant would not be credible.
If you are wilfully blind as to the circumstances and you know the bike is worth more, then you can be committing the offence.
